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In recent years, the proliferation of the Internet of Things (IoT) is seen across
various sectors. There is a sharp inclination towards using IoT devices in both
home and oce premises. Many traditional manufacturers are enhancing their
traditional appliances into IoT devices. With the myriad of devices in the market,
there also exist vulnerable devices which can be exploited by adversaries. Several
security solutions are trying to address dierent areas of security such as network
security, privacy, threat detection, etc. IoT Sentinel is one such novel system that
can identify device types based on their pattern of communication. IoT Sentinel
proposes several isolation levels that can be used to control the trac of devices
identied as vulnerable. IoT Sentinel uses a Software-dened Networking (SDN)
component for controlling the trac ow for devices and isolating them.
In this thesis, we develop a solution to extend IoT Sentinel for device isolation,
which is not dependent on SDN. The goal is to build a generic and deployable
solution for network segmentation and device isolation that is suitable for home
networks. The system divides the network into isolated subnets and places new
devices into appropriate subnets. Communication between the subnets is con-
trolled using a rewall thereby isolating them. We dynamically congure a DHCP
server to place (lease IP address) new IoT devices identied by IoT Sentinel into
appropriate subnets based on their level of vulnerability. Using our solution, we
can conne vulnerable devices. Thus, the solution minimizes the damage that
could be caused by vulnerable devices present in a network.
Finally, we evaluate the developed solution for its security requirement of device
isolation. We also present the performance evaluation of our solution based on
time-delay and throughput analysis. We observe that our solution adds an ac-
ceptable delay to the existing IoT Sentinel processes. We also observe that the
system throughput is not signicantly aected by rewall rules in a home network
scenario.
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Abbreviations and Acronyms
IoT Internet of Things
AP Access Point
BLE Bluetooth Low Energy
WLAN Wireless Local Area Network
IP Internet Protocol
SDN Software-dened Networking
SOHO Small Oce/Home Oce
TCP/IP Transmission Control Protocol / Internet Protocol
DHCP Dynamic Host Conguration Protocol
BYOD Bring Your Own Device
BS Base Station
DMZ Demilitarized Zone
EAP Extensible Authentication Protocol
WEP Wired Equivalent Privacy
WPS Wi-Fi Protected Setup
PSK Pre-shared Key
CVE Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures
NAT Network Address Translation
GUI Graphical User Interface
JSON JavaScript Object Notation
OTS O-the-shelf
UI User Interface
IoTSSP Internet of Things Security Service Provider
AAA Authentication, Authorization, and Accounting
VLAN Virtual Local Area Network
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Motivation
The Internet of Things (IoT) is a popular trend and is already a part of
our lives. Numerous vendors are currently producing a wide range of IP-
connected devices targeted for homes and oces. The number of connected
devices is expected to grow up to 50.1 billion by 2020 with a projected com-
pound growth rate of 23.1 % between 2014 and 2020 annually [43].
In a home network, users typically connect their IoT devices to an AP
(Access Point) with authentication methods such as Wi-Fi Protected Access
(WPA), Wi-Fi Protected Access II (WPA2), Wi-Fi Protected Setup (WPS).
Typically, all the devices become part of a single network provided by the
access point. IoT devices available in the market have a varying level of secu-
rity features. Many devices are sold by traditional home appliances vendors,
which may not have adequate expertise in the security domain. As a result,
several IoT devices are often shipped with awed security designs and vulner-
abilities. Moreover, several vendors do not provide security updates for their
vulnerable devices in a timely manner. Therefore, there is a high possibility
of vulnerable devices being a part of a user's network. Vulnerable devices in
the network provide an opportunity for adversaries to mount attacks by ex-
ploiting vulnerabilities and perform malicious activities, for example, gaining
unauthorized access to the user's network or associated devices. Therefore,
there is a need for a mechanism to identify vulnerable devices and control
their communication in a network and mitigate the security risks involved.
IoT Sentinel [52] is a system that protects a user's network from vulnera-
ble devices by identifying and isolating them. The system provides an access
point (AP) for IoT devices. IoT Sentinel identies the type of a device and
infers its vulnerability level. The information provided by IoT Sentinel is
1
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called an isolation prole which denes abilities of a device for communica-
tion. The communication of the vulnerable devices is controlled to mitigate
the risks associated with it by isolating it from legitimate devices. IoT Sen-
tinel uses a Software-dened Networking (SDN) controller to isolate devices.
Traditional APs used in home networks usually do not support SDN, which
limits the deployment of IoT Sentinel in home networks. In this thesis, we
aim to nd a generic solution which does not rely on SDN for device isolation.
The goal of this thesis is to develop a solution for wireless and wired
device isolation which is easily deployable for home networks. The solution
is developed as an extension to IoT Sentinel. We aim to isolate devices
in the network into dierent network segments and use generally available
mechanisms for network segmentation and access control. The solution is
intended to be simple, easy to use and to congure.
The proposed solution divides the user's network into dierent segments
using a subnetting approach. The devices in dierent subnets have com-
munication capabilities according to their isolation prole. A DHCP server
is used to dene the network topology and allocate devices into dierent
subnets. The communication across subnets is controlled using a rewall.
The solution is based on customized DHCP server that uses the isolation
prole from IoT Sentinel and isolates the devices by allocating them into
appropriate subnets.
1.2 Contributions
The contributions of this thesis are:
 A technique for automatically enforcing isolation proles from
IoT Sentinel using commonly available network primitives
Our solution integrates with IoT Sentinel and automatically enforces
the isolation proles which are used to perform device isolation. IoT
Sentinel uses an SDN based approach to utilize isolation proles to
perform device isolation. We proposed and implemented a mechanism
to perform device isolation which uses commonly available network
primitives and does not rely on SDN. Our technique divides the network
into dierent isolated network segments. Dierent network segments
are constructed by subnetting the network. Communication across the
network segments is controlled by iptables rules. A DHCP server
is customized to provide IP addresses in order to place devices into
required network segments. We enforced isolation proles to control
the communication of a device with other devices in the network and
the Internet.
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 Evaluation of the implemented device isolation approach.
We evaluated our device isolation solution to measure the delay over-
head incurred on the IoT Sentinel setup for device identication. We
observed a timing delay of +42.07% and +35.6% over IoT Sentinel de-
vice identication while performing isolation for two test devices. We
also evaluated the eects of the number of rewall rules on the system
throughput and observed that having 1000 iptables rules decreased
the throughput by 2.72%. We also discussed the deployability of the
proposed solution.
1.3 Organization
We now present the organization of this thesis and the information that is
contained in subsequent chapters.
Chapter 2 describes the background information about IoT and the
security in IoT networks. We also give an overview of the IoT Sentinel
system and explain the related technical background for our work. Chapter
3 describes the problem statement and the attacker model. We also list
and explain the requirements for our solution. Chapter 4 describes the
proposed solution and the implementation details of the system. Chapter
5 evaluates the implemented system against the requirements and discusses
the results. Chapter 6 presents the related work. Chapter 7 summarizes
the contributions made by thesis, provides some directions for future work
and draws conclusions.
Chapter 2
Background
2.1 Internet of Things (IoT) Overview
Back in 1988, Mark Weiser coined the phrase \ubiquitous computing" which
is referred to as a concept where computing is available anywhere and any-
time [65]. The term \Internet of Things" was rst coined by Kevin Ashton
in 1999 [49]. Internet of Things, commonly referred as IoT is an ubiqui-
tous concept where physical objects are connected to the Internet and have
an ability to communicate over a network [56]. Such networked objects or
things are referred as IoT devices and are deployed universally. The pene-
tration of IoT has been seen across numerous sectors such as building and
home automation, smart cities, smart manufacturing, industrial automation,
automobiles, wearables, healthcare, farming etc. The power of connectivity
oered by IoT has been utilized in various use cases related to such sectors.
According to the analysts from the rm Juniper Research, the number of
expected IoT connected devices will reach 38.5 billion by 2020 [47]. There-
fore, IoT is one of the most current and popular areas of research in which
many big companies are investing billions in research and development [60].
Having the extremely large number of interconnected devices, conguration
and management of these devices do not seem feasible if we do not have
automated approaches.
One of the application areas of IoT is Smart home. A smart home is
a home with intelligent IoT household devices, which provides better living
conditions to the owner. Smart home IoT devices are bought and installed
in the home in order to improve the overall comfort and accessibility which
makes regular household jobs automated, easier and better. The applicabil-
ity of IoT devices in the home can be seen in dierent scenarios, for example,
controlling of home lights eciently using smart bulbs, automatically main-
4
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taining the temperature and humidity of the house using smart thermostats,
securing the entrances etc. People store lots of condential and personal in-
formation across such smart household devices. Such devices are connected
to the Internet via the home network using the router equipment. Home is a
place where people consider themselves safe and keep their belongings safe.
So, maintaining the privacy of the user and securing the home network is an
important task. IoT devices communicate using a dierent set of protocols
available for communication. Dierent wireless standards like Wi-Fi [39],
Bluetooth LE [26], ZigBee [29], Z-Wave [31] etc, exist are used to make IoT
Smart home automation feasible [61] .
Figure 2.1 shows the typical IoT smart home scenario. A smart home con-
sists of several smart devices. The major components in the gure are Access
Point (AP), IoT devices, the Internet, the cloud service, and a control device
(smartphone). AP is the central hub that connects dierent IoT devices to
the external world. Usually, an AP is connected to the wired network and
provides a point of communication among devices. Several IoT devices, for
example, smart switch, smart fridge, smart TV, surveillance camera, ther-
mostat, smoke detector etc are deployed in the home. These dierent devices
have dierent features and tasks to support home automation. The control
device is typically a smartphone which is used to congure and monitor dif-
ferent IoT devices. The Internet is the major component that connects the
IoT devices, AP, the control device, and cloud services together. Currently,
most of the IoT devices requires vendor specic smartphone application for
conguration and management purpose [4, 25] through the control device.
Whenever an IoT device is initially congured, it connects to AP for au-
thentication using vendor-specic smartphone application installed on the
control device. This initial conguration requires physical access to the de-
vice for resetting purpose which improves the security issues that may arise
due to unattended access. Dynamic Host Control Protocol (DHCP) server
is a component in the router that provides IP connectivity information to
devices. Once authentication is successful, IoT device gets the IP congu-
ration from the DHCP server and becomes part of the network provided by
AP. These devices are controllable remotely via the control device. Most
IoT devices usually communicate with their vendor-specic cloud service to
store and process data. Such data can be user privacy sensitive, for example
surveillance cameras may send live capture of the room to their respective
cloud service. The control device is used to control and monitor the IoT
devices using a registered user account which displays data in a presentable
way through the application.
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Figure 2.1: Smart home IoT Scenario [33]
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2.2 Threats in IoT Network
The emergence of IoT has brought enormous possibilities and probable use
cases that aect our lives from dierent aspects. With the upsides comes
downsides as well. IoT has been increasingly popular and attractive even to
attackers. Security problems in IoT environment arise due to careless pro-
gram design of IoT devices and heterogeneous interconnected complex pro-
tocols [67]. Several attacks targeting connected devices have been reported
in the media and include popular brand names like Philips [41, 44]. It has
also been reported that even a single aw can aect a wide range of prod-
ucts from WiFi cameras, camera recorders and cloud storage devices from the
same vendor [62]. A single fault aected multiple devices since manufacturers
reuse vulnerable code across dierent device models. Recent news about two
hackers remotely controlling the air-conditioning, radio, windshield wipers
and even an accelerator of a jeep [45] present the security loophole in IoT
systems installed in the jeep. Such kind of failure can be life-threatening for a
driver of a jeep. There has been news [46] about WikiLeaks leaked document
which reports that some models of Samsung televisions are also vulnerable.
Those vulnerable TVs secretly record audio when the TV screen is o and
send it to Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) server when TV is turned on
and its Internet connection is re-established. In 2014, it was also revealed
that more than 100,000 consumer gadgets including home networking routers,
televisions, and refrigerators were targeted for a large-scale attack to send
750,000 malicious emails to individuals and business enterprises [12].
The stake of having vulnerable devices in the network is quite high. There
is a strong urge to identify and control vulnerable devices before we grant
them access to our home network. Securing a home network is dicult to
achieve since numerous threats like denial of service, back door, and remote
administration programs, malware etc exists [13]. With the enormous po-
tential of IoT, it brings security and privacy concerns. Some IoT devices
that are deployed in users' network are vulnerable and can be exploited by
attackers [46]. Since IoT devices are capable of connecting to the Internet,
vulnerable IoT devices are attractive for attackers to target dierent kinds
of attacks to other devices in the network and breaking into the network
[57]. One solution to deal with such vulnerable devices is to patch them with
an updated security solution. However, most device manufacturers do not
produce patch on time because of associated overhead cost for support. It is
also seen that production and support for devices are discontinued after the
short period of time of its launch [1, 19].
Ordinary access points provided by Smart Oce Home Oce (SOHO)
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routers which are widely used in home networks lack security measures such
as wireless client isolation, guest network allocation, updated encryption
modules etc. Naive users do not have adequate knowledge about the need
for updating the router rmware. For a normal user, updating a rmware is
a daunting task since it requires series of manual task. Thus old routers in-
clude a high risk of being exploited due to lack of proper security mechanism
and xes.
Whenever a device joins the AP, it is authenticated by wireless authenti-
cation mechanism implemented at the router. After successful authentication
of IoT device with AP, IoT device is granted IP connectivity. IP connectiv-
ity leases are provided by DHCP server. In this kind of scenario, security
provided by the AP is a crucial factor to protect the network. If AP is not
protected with the security feature to restrict the capability of vulnerable
devices, an attacker can use that vulnerable device to attack other devices
in the network. For example, any compromised surveillance camera in ex-
plained home setup may upload the live feed to some remote server so that
attacker can have 24/7 live view of a home. This kind of situation breaches
the overall security of the home which is fully against the purpose of hav-
ing a camera at home. So, identication of device before granting access to
the network is highly important. With proper identication of the device
and dening its security boundaries, security of the overall network can be
maintained.
A Wi-Fi network is one of the widely used ways to connect to the In-
ternet. When IoT devices want to associate with Wi-Fi network, there is
a need of establishing security relationship between IoT device and a Wi-Fi
access point. The devices that want to connect to Wi-Fi networks are also
referred to as supplicant. Wi-networks make use of authentication protocol
to build the trust relationship and verify the client. Dierent wireless secu-
rity protocols, for example, WEP, WPA, WPA2-Personal, WPA2-Enterprise
etc exists. Such security protocols are evolving and are enhanced to address
the security need of a wireless network. These protocols ensure data con-
dentiality and integrity. Choosing older security protocols which are prone
to dictionary-based brute force attacks questions the overall security of an
access point. An attacker can perform an attack to extract the passphrase
which can be used to join the network.
The need for identication of IoT devices and dening their capabilities
for communication in a network is addressed in a recent work named IoT
Sentinel [52]
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2.3 IoT Sentinel
IoT Sentinel is a solution that can automatically identify the device type
whenever a device is introduced in the network. It makes use of network
trac of a device during initial bootstrapping for device type identication.
Device identication can help to dene if the device is vulnerable or not.
Based on its vulnerability assessment, IoT Sentinel provides an isolation
prole for a device that can be used to dene the capabilities of a device for
further communication. After identication of a vulnerable device, proper
protection mechanisms are deployed such that it can coexist with the other
trusted devices in the network without aecting the security of the network.
IoT Sentinel tries to achieve such protection by controlling the trac ow of
vulnerable devices.
2.3.1 System Design of IoT Sentinel
The system design goal of IoT Sentinel is based on the requirement of a
browneld approach. The term browneld approach refers to scenarios where
a solution needs to be integrated into an existing legacy system and the
option of developing a new solution from the ground up is not available.
The authors of IoT Sentinel [52] have dened a device-type to denote the
combination of make, model and software version of a device. IoT Sentinel
has two major components. The rst component is the Security Gateway
and another one is IoT Security Service. The design of IoT Sentinel is shown
in Figure 2.2.
The Security Gateway is the core of IoT Sentinel implementation which
collaborates with the IoT Security Service hosted in the cloud. Security
Gateway acts as an access point for IoT devices to associate with the net-
work. Security Gateway is deployed locally in a device capable of providing
a wireless access point. Security gateway ngerprints new devices whenever
they are rst introduced to the network. Fingerprint capture of a device
consists of some distinct communication pattern that can be used in the
identication of the device. Such ngerprints are then sent to IoT Secu-
rity Service for device type identication and vulnerability assessment. Once
device ngerprint is received by IoT Security Service Provider (IoTSSP), it
uses a machine learning-based device identication technique to compare the
received ngerprint with existing reference ngerprints. After a comparison
is made, the correct device type is identied. IoTSSP also maintains the
database of isolation prole linked with the device type. Based on device
type identied, a corresponding prole for device type is retrieved. IoT Se-
CHAPTER 2. BACKGROUND 10
Figure 2.2: IoT Sentinel System Design [52]
curity Service returns back the corresponding isolation prole to the security
gateway. Isolation prole contains information about the device name, isola-
tion level, permitted IPs etc. An isolation prole is used by security gateway
to grant access to the network for a device. After the device is identied by
IoTSSP and isolation prole is received by the security gateway, some de-
vice isolation technique must be in place to utilize those isolation proles and
provide network access to the device. The technique adjusts network congu-
ration settings and necessary enforcement rules at security gateway to ensure
that the device gets connected to the network with predened capabilities in
isolation prole. The design of a system to utilize the isolation prole and
maintain enforcement rules at security gateway ensures the segregation of
the devices into dierent network segments.
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2.3.2 Device Fingerprinting
Whenever a new IoT device is introduced to the network, we capture the
communication involving the Wi-Fi association to build the ngerprint. The
ngerprinting process is done using passively observed trac. IoT devices
have a vendor-specic procedure to associate the device to the gateway and
induct into the network. So, the aim of ngerprinting procedure is to capture
the distinguishable sequence of communication between the device and the
gateway. When a newly observed MAC address is identied at the gateway,
the ngerprint capturing process collects n packets fp1; p2; p3; p4:::::png. Since
device conguration time varies across dierent devices, a standard timeout is
set to capture all the packets in two minutes. After the ngerprinting process
is over, the feature extraction is done. 23 dierent features are extracted from
each packet which generates a 23n matrix F , which is a device ngerprint.
Packet features include dierent information about the typical protocols and
features used during device association in Wi-Fi network. Authors then
compressed the initial ngerprint F . F 0 is a compressed ngerprint generated
from F , which is composed of 12 rst unique vector packets p to produce
276-dimensional feature vector (12packets 23features). F 0 is used as
input for device type identication.
2.3.3 Device Type Identication
The device type identication is done in two steps. The rst step is nger-
print classication, which relies on n classiers. The device type identica-
tion process refers to the process of analyzing the ngerprint generated to
identify the device type. For device type identication, the prerequisite is to
have a classier for each device type with reference ngerprints. They are im-
plemented as Random Forest classiers [36] which renders a binary decision
if the input ngerprint matches the device type. When a new ngerprint F 0
goes through the classication process, a prediction of the limited number of
reference ngerprints for the candidate device types is done. In the second
step, the edit distance discrimination is computed by comparing the nger-
print with the subset of ngerprints matched after the classication process.
The comparison is done by computing Damerau-Levenshtein distances [40].
The result of distance computation is used to get a global dissimilarity score
with all the reference ngerprints. The lowest dissimilarity score gives the
nal predicted device type for the ngerprint.
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2.3.4 Device Isolation
Device Isolation refers to the separation of a device in dierent network seg-
ments. Once a device type is identied, IoTSSP extracts the corresponding
isolation prole and returns it to the security gateway. The isolation prole
is a JSON le that consists of a device name, isolation level, allowed IPs, and
ID. The isolation level dened in the isolation prole determines which part
of the network the device should be placed in. The isolation level values, 0,
1, and 2 correspond to strict, restricted and trusted level of isolation respec-
tively. Figure 2.3 represents a sample isolation prole sent by IoTSSP. The
sample isolation prole shows a device named ABCDEF with ID 1 and iso-
lation level of 1 which implies that device should be placed in the restricted
part of an untrusted network. The allowed ips eld species that the device
should be able to access IP address 13.20.224.22 but should not have access
to the rest of the Internet. The signicance of dierent isolation levels is
explained further below.
{
"name": "ABCDEF",
"allowed_ips": ["13.20.224.22"],
"isolation": 1,
"id": 1
}
Figure 2.3: Sample Isolation Prole received from IoTSSP [53]
Figure 2.4 depicts the isolation approach of IoT Sentinel. IoT Sentinel
divides the user's network into two network overlays: an untrusted (isolation
level 0 and 1) and a trusted network (isolation level 2). Devices within
these overlays should not communicate with each other. The trusted network
should have unrestricted Internet access. An untrusted network is further
divided into strict (isolation level 0) and restricted (isolation level 1). Internet
connectivity should not available for the strict part of the untrusted network.
The restricted part of the untrusted network should have limited Internet
access. Untrusted devices which may need a limited set of vendor-specic
cloud service access are placed on the restricted network. All vulnerable
devices are isolated in the untrusted network so that they cannot mount
attacks on the trusted devices. Enforcement rules are necessary to control
the trac in the network. Prior to our work, the enforcement rules in the
network for these overlays are generated by a customized SDN controller
according to the isolation prole. Such enforcement rules make network
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isolation feasible by intercepting all trac ows in the network and ltering
them.
Figure 2.4: Isolation Technique in IoT Sentinel [52]
2.3.5 Implementation
The prototype implementation of IoT Sentinel consists of two major compo-
nents, Security Gateway and a cloud-based IoT Security Service [53].
The Security Gateway is implemented in Raspberry Pi 3 device which
sets up a wireless AP in infrastructure mode which ensures that all clients
communicate only via the AP. The wireless AP is congured using hostapd
[50]. hostapd consists of a conguration le named hostapd.conf which is
used to congure dierent parameters required to set up an AP. The pro-
totype implementation uses open-source Floodlight SDN controller v1.2 [32]
which is customized to detect new devices in the network, initiate device
ngerprinting and communicate with IoT Security service.
IoT Security Service is the service that is hosted in the cloud. IoT Security
Service Provider in cloud hosts the machine learning based approach of IoT
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Sentinel to identify the device type and return isolation prole.
Security Gateway and IoT Security Service communicates using restful
API over HTTP/HTTPS.
A user Interface is developed for demo purpose and testing. User Interface
depicts the real-time display of IoT Sentinel operations when a new device
is detected at the gateway. It can provide information about current state
of multiple devices being congured. The user interface is developed using
Autobahn server [2]. Autobahn server allows tracking of real-time messaging
between websockets which can be displayed in the browser. Figure 2.5 shows
the user interface of the device going through IoT Sentinel device identi-
cation process. When a new device is encountered at the gateway, device
features are extracted, compressed and sent to IoTSSP for classication. As
seen in Figure 2.5, classication results are obtained which species that the
device is identied as NetAmo whose isolation level is 2.
Figure 2.5: IoT Sentinel UI showing device identication [53]
2.4 Technical background
This section is intended to give a general overview of dierent technologies,
tools, and components used in the implementation.
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2.4.1 Python
Python [28] is an interpreted, object-oriented, high-level programming lan-
guage. Python is highly readable and can be applied to solve various prob-
lems both in product development and research prototypes. Python has
been extensively used for scientic computing, web development, scripting,
development of games etc. The Python implementation consists of numerous
built-in and standard modules. Python distributions are available for mul-
tiple platforms and are commonly used across most used operating systems
(OS X, Windows, and Ubuntu). During the work, versions 3.4 and 3.5 of
Python are used across dierent components. Several packages like Numpy,
SciPy, and Pandas are available for Python which provides the basis for ef-
cient scientic computing. These packages provide high dimensional data
structures and tools to work with it.
2.4.2 Shell Scripting
Shell Scripting [3] refers to the way of creating scripts that can be used in
order to execute the tasks in a run time environment. Scripts help to auto-
mate the tasks according to the user goals. Bash shell scripts are used widely
during the implementation for automating the experimentation of prototype,
invoking other external components, and maintaining the appropriate net-
work congurations.
2.4.3 Raspberry Pi
Raspberry Pi is a single board basic computer developed by the Raspberry Pi
foundation that is intended to raise the interest in computing for school going
children [23]. It is equally popular for dierent purposes in academic research
and prototype development because of its low cost. Several dierent versions
of Raspberry Pi are available in the market. The considered model for im-
plementation is Raspberry Pi 3 Model B which has support for Bluetooth
and wireless LAN connectivity. Raspbian [7] is a free Debian based ocially
supported operating system which is optimized especially for Raspberry Pi
hardware. Minibian [18] is the minimal version of Raspbian which does not
have a GUI. The goal of using Minibian is to maximize resources utilization
of Pi for our solution. Raspberry Pi device can be used as a wireless AP for
prototype development.
CHAPTER 2. BACKGROUND 16
2.4.4 Hostapd
hostapd stands for Host Access Point Daemon [50]. It is a software that can
be used to turn a network interface into an access point. Using hostapd, it
is possible to congure any device that supports Wireless Local Area Net-
work (WLAN) in access point mode to a wireless base station. Many of
the appliances that act as WLAN router are Linux computers which run
hostapd software. hostapd implements IEEE 802.11 AP and IEEE 802.1/W-
PA/WPA2/EAP/RADIUS Authenticators [50]. The conguration le for
hostapd can be modied to set parameters such as listening wireless inter-
face, Service Set Identier (SSID) of a network, authentication algorithm to
use such as WPA or WEP or both, passphrase to connect to network etc.
The 802.11 specication denes two modes of operation for wireless com-
munication, namely, ad-hoc mode and infrastructure mode. In ad-hoc mode,
all clients can communicate directly with each other, whereas in infrastruc-
ture mode, clients are connected to a central access point through which all
communication passes. The infrastructure mode provides increased wireless
range and additional security controls [30].
2.4.5 DHCP
The Dynamic Host Control Protocol (DHCP) [42] is a network protocol that
is widely used to automatically distribute network conguration parameters
(eg. IP addresses) for hosts in a network. DHCP simplies and automates
the job of the network administrator to handle multiple devices and systems.
There are dierent DHCP servers available, such as, isc-dhcp-server [14],
dnsmasq [5] etc. The DHCP server can be customized for specifying xed IP
address for hosts and managing groups of devices.
The DHCP communication between the client and server includes four
dierent kinds of messages explained below.
1. DHCPDISCOVER: During the initialization state, when a client
needs IP connectivity, it broadcasts DHCPDISCOVER packet on the
network.
2. DHCPOFFER: The DHCP Server responds to the DHCPDISCOVER
packet with a DHCPOFFER packet. The DHCPOFFER packet con-
tains the IP address allocated to the device, default gateway, subnet
mask, etc.
3. DHCPREQUEST: When a client receives the DHCPOFFER packet
from the server, it responds back with DHCPREQUEST packet for an
IP address oered by the server.
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4. DHCPACK: The server sends back the DHCPACK packet as an ac-
knowledgement to the DHCPREQUEST packet stating that the client
can use the IP address for the amount of time leased.
Figure 2.6 depicts the DHCP client-server communication and the three
dierent states of a DHCP client. In the Initialization state, a DHCP client
does not have an existing lease for an IP address. To get a new lease,
DHCPDISCOVER, DHCPOFFER, DHCPREQUEST and DHCPACK pack-
ets are exchanged between the client and the server. The lease is limited for
a certain amount of time as specied by the server.
Once half of the lease time expires (T1), the DHCP client resends DHCPRE-
QUEST packet to the server asking for the renewal of the existing lease. If
DHCP server has availability of address, it sends back DHCPACK back to
the client which ensures the renewal of the lease.
If the renewal process is not successful after 87.5% of original lease time
(T2) amount of time, the DHCP client goes in the rebinding state. The client
broadcasts DHCPREQUEST messages to attempt to contact any available
DHCP server. If it receives DHCPACK from any server, the rebinding is
successful and client existing lease is renewed.
Figure 2.6: DHCP Client/Server Communication
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2.4.6 Subnets
A subnet is a logical division of an IP network [54]. The process of creating
subnets is commonly known as subnetting. Subnetting help to make clear
separation within a network. Two dierent kinds of addressing schemes are
available for IP addresses. IPv4 is a 32-bit addressing scheme while IPv6 is
a 128-bit addressing scheme. IPv4 address is a 32-bit 4 octant integer [37].
The value of each octant varies from 0 to 255. A single IP address basically
consists of two parts: the network part and the host part. IP addresses
are represented using Classless Inter-Domain Routing (CIDR) notation. For
example, if we consider IP address 192.168.1.0/24, the /24 sux at the end
species that the rst 24 bits of the IP address represents network part and
last 8 bits represent the host part. We can borrow host bits to dene subnets
depending on the number of hosts we need in our network. If we borrow n
bit from host part we can have 2n subnets with 2(8 n) hosts in each subnet.
The ecient creation of subnets depends upon the requirements of a network.
2.4.7 iptables
Ecient ltering rules are essential in order to control the communication in
a network. The Linux kernel has an inbuilt network packet processing system
known as Netlter. The conguration of Netlter is done using iptables
command. iptables is widely used in order to create, maintain, and inspect
the tables that are used for IPv4 trac ltering. Using iptables, we can
dene such tables which consist of a set of rules. Using such rules we can
lter/drop the packets. iptables operates at the network layer. We can de-
ne several tables containing built-in chains or user-dened chains. A chain
consists of the set of rules that match the certain set of packets. Dierent
special values like ACCEPT, DROP, QUEUE or RETURN can be specied
in the rule to determine if the packet can be transmitted through the inter-
face. Processing of packets is done sequentially across the rules in the chain.
One simple example of iptables rule isiptables -A INPUT -i eth0 -p
tcp -s 192.168.1.20 -j DROP. The rule ensures that TCP packets whose
source is 192.168.1.20 are dropped at interface eth0. We can write multi-
ple rules based on our requirement which can be dened based on device,
network, port, interfaces etc.
iptables rules can also be used to enable Internet connectivity for net-
works that are behind a Network Address Translation (NAT). IP masquerad-
ing is a networking function that is used to provide connection to the Internet
for devices with the private IP address that are connected to the Linux host
with an Internet connection [16]. IP masquerading masks the requests from
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nodes with the IP address of the host's external device. For example, the
following rule allows requests coming from source network 192.168.0.0/16 to
be masked with the IP address of output interface eth0, thereby, enabling
Internet connectivity.
iptables -t nat -I POSTROUTING -o eth0
-s 192.168.0.0/16 -j MASQUERADE
Chapter 3
Problem Statement
3.1 Problem Statement
The IoT ecosystem consists of multiple devices from dierent vendors with
varying security designs and implementations. In a typical home environment
IoT setup, several IP-connected IoT devices coexist with dierent gateways,
cloud-based systems, and other devices. Attackers are interested in the vul-
nerable devices in the home network for various malicious reasons such as
launching an attack against other devices in the network, exltrate personal
data etc. Another example is that an eavesdropper can illegitimately gain
access to a vulnerable device or sni communication in the network. Thus,
the presence of vulnerable IoT devices in the network introduces privacy
and security concerns. Legitimate devices may also collect privacy sensitive
data without the consent of the user. It is crucial to address the security of
the home network eectively so that the IoT ecosystem runs with minimum
security issues.
We present the following scenarios in which IoT systems can bring se-
curity and privacy issues. Consider a malicious smart television, which is
connected to the Internet that secretly records audio and sends it to some
remote server without the knowledge of the owner. This scenario is presented
by Hartley-Parkinson [46] in detail. In such a case, the malicious device must
be identied and restricted from the home network. Consider another sce-
nario where all the devices in a home are on a single unsegmented network. If
some device is vulnerable, an attacker can access other devices or the network
via the vulnerable device as a backdoor and perform malicious activities.
There is a strong need for isolating communication of vulnerable devices.
A vulnerable device must be isolated such that its communication with other
trusted devices in the network is restricted. If a potentially vulnerable device
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connects to the network, it should coexist with other devices without aecting
the level of security in the network. However, isolation should not aect the
communication for secure devices. IoT Sentinel proposes a mechanism to
identify vulnerable devices and protect the network against such devices.
IoT Sentinel provides the device identication service at the access point.
In addition to device identication, IoT Sentinel implements device isolation
in the SDN controller. SDN is more suitable for managing a large network
which needs to adapt dynamically. Implementing SDN for home networks
adds complexity and needs proper network administration skills. Moreover,
most legacy o-the-shelf (OTS) routers do not support SDN. Thus, there is
a need for a generic network segmentation solution implemented in the secu-
rity gateway which can be easily deployed in home networks. The solution
should replace the SDN component used in IoT Sentinel for device isolation.
The new solution is intended to be a software solution, which removes the
complicated aspect of SDN aided approach but provides a similar function-
ality for device isolation. The solution must control communication of IoT
devices within the IoT network and to the Internet. Device isolation in IoT
Sentinel is based on the isolation prole of a device. Therefore, enforcement
of the isolation prole obtained from IoT Sentinel provides the base of our
work.
3.2 Attacker Model
To build a secure system, it is important to identify the threats to the sys-
tem [55]. IoT Sentinel is targeted at a typical home or small oce network
setup. The AP provides IP connectivity to various wired and wireless de-
vices. The authors of IoT Sentinel have assumed that when an IoT device
initially connects to the AP, it might have security vulnerabilities but is ini-
tially considered benign [52]. In this section, we present an attacker model
for a Wi-Fi network with respect to IoT Sentinel. We explain the attacker
goals, attack surface, and attacker capabilities.
3.2.1 Attacker Goals
The primary goal of an attacker is to compromise a vulnerable device. An
attacker may want to use a compromised device as a stepping stone to launch
attacks against other devices in the network. The attacker may communi-
cate with a compromised device remotely from the Internet. If attackers have
control over a compromised device in a network, they may spread malware
or viruses to other devices in the network. An attacker may want to sni,
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tamper or obstruct the communication between the device and the AP or
other devices. The attacker may want to tamper network parameters, exl-
trate data to the Internet, obtain security credentials etc. The attacker may
use the compromised device to attack devices or services on the Internet.
3.2.2 Attack Surface
An attack surface refers to the entry points in the system where an attacker
can get unauthorized access and perform malicious activities. In a home
network, vulnerable devices form a major part of the attack surface and can
be exploited to compromise dierent aspects of a network. The compromises
may be related to disrupting the communication channel, the AP, or the
devices themselves. The communication channel between a device and the
AP forms an attack surface since it can be subject to several attacks such
as sning and tampering. The direct device to device communication can
also be considered as an attack surface since it is beyond the control of the
gateway. We consider that the attacks on the devices and network are remote
rather than physical. Although even physical access to the devices can lead
to tampering.
3.2.3 Attacker Capabilities
A compromised IoT device serves as the entry point to the network for an
attacker. An attacker can have control over a compromised device. If com-
munication of IoT device is unencrypted, an attacker can passively monitor
trac [35] in the communication channel. An attacker can use compromised
devices to communicate with other legitimate devices in the network. An
attacker can introduce malware through a compromised device and spread
the infection to other devices. An infected IoT device can be used to locate
other vulnerable devices on the Wi-Fi network. A compromised device can
open an attack path for remote attackers (e.g. through an SSH tunnel). An
attacker can apply reverse engineering techniques on a compromised IoT de-
vice to nd and use backdoors (created for testing) in order to exploit the
device [67]. An attacker can capture the 4-way handshake between a device
and the AP and perform a dictionary attack on the message integrity data
to nd out the passphrase [51].
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3.3 Requirements
This section explains the requirements for the solution to address the prob-
lem statement explained in Section 3.1. Requirements S1 is a security re-
quirement. Requirements R1, R2, and R3 are functional requirements while
requirements U1 and U2 are usability requirements.
S1: Restricting communication of vulnerable devices
The solution must restrict communication of vulnerable devices and isolate
them. This means that a vulnerable device should not be able to commu-
nicate with rest of the network and the Internet. This would potentially
restrict the capabilities of an attacker that are discussed in Section 3.2.3.
With this requirement, we intend to reduce the attack surface area. All de-
vice to device and device to Internet communication must be analyzed and
controlled at the security gateway. Communication between devices in dif-
ferent network segments should not be allowed. The solution should ensure
that all communication is controlled and monitored.
R1: Enforce isolation prole from IoT Sentinel
IoT Sentinel [52] denes an isolation prole for each device type. The iso-
lation prole for a device consists of information that is used to segregate
it. The solution should create an isolation environment which is able to sep-
arate devices into dierent network segments based on the isolation prole
provided by IoT Sentinel.
R2: Easy and fast (re)conguration of network
Whenever a new device is introduced in a network, the reconguration pro-
cess of the network to integrate the device should have a low overhead and no
impact on other devices. An IoT device may have a specic prole allowing
access to certain IP addresses after initial bootstrapping. Therefore, access
control mechanism for a specic device or a group of devices should also be
supported dynamically according to the information specied in the isolation
prole.
R3: Performance
The usability of the system is a crucial factor to consider. The system should
have a high usability, low-performance overhead, with minimum time over-
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head on IoT Sentinel's existing processes. Timing and bandwidth analysis of
the introduced solution should be evaluated.
U1: Deployment
The device isolation solution is intended to be easily deployable in O-the-
shelf (OTS) routers or gateways. The choice of tools used for device isolation
should be suitable for its deployment in OTS routers.
U2: Demo user interface
The isolation approach should be depicted with a user interface (UI) that is
useful for showing the dierent steps of device isolation. The UI is intended
to be helpful for collecting data for evaluation and debugging purposes.
Chapter 4
Proposed Solution and Implemen-
tation
In this chapter, we describe the proposed solution and its implementation.
The implementation work is an enhancement to IoT Sentinel to address the
requirements discussed in Section 3.3. We rst discuss the capabilities needed
for the solution in Section 4.1.1. Sections 4.1.3 and 4.1.4 present the design
and ow diagram of the solution. Section 4.2 discusses the implementation
choices for the techniques and tools used in the solution. Section 4.3 describes
the implementation details of the system.
4.1 Proposed Solution
4.1.1 Capabilities
The capabilities of the intended solution are as follows.
Enforcement of isolation prole As mentioned in requirement R1, the
system must use the isolation prole obtained from IoT Sentinel. First,
the isolation level and allowed IPs should be parsed from the isolation
prole. Thereafter, the device must be placed into an appropriate
network segment based on the isolation level which determines if the
device is vulnerable or not.
Construction of Network The system must dene a network where de-
vices can be segregated into untrusted and trusted networks. As de-
scribed in Section 2.3.4, the network should be divided into Strict,
Restricted and Trusted isolated network segments.
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Control of Communication The system should have the ability to control
the communication between devices. The objective is to control the
communication of devices according to their isolation level. One such
capability is to prevent the communication of vulnerable devices to
trusted devices and the Internet.
Dynamic Management of hosts The system should make sure that the
devices (hosts) get the correct conguration for connectivity during
initial device conguration and later device functioning. Initially, the
device should have access to the Internet for device conguration. After
the device is congured, based on its isolation prole, the network
conguration for the device must be updated dynamically according to
its network segment determined by isolation level.
4.1.2 System Components
The proposed solution consists of the following components. Figure 4.1 de-
picts the major components of the proposed system. The major components
are isolation map, DHCP server, and rewall. User Interface is an additional
component which is not responsible for core responsibilities of the solution
but is useful for tracking of connected devices and debugging. The compo-
nents are described below.
Isolation Map The isolation map is a list of device MAC addresses mapped
to their isolation levels. The isolation map is placed locally at the se-
curity gateway to keep track of connected devices and their isolation
levels. The isolation map is updated every time a new device is con-
nected or an isolation prole is received from IoTSSP.
DHCP Server The DHCP Server provides IP addresses and network con-
guration settings to the client connected to the wireless AP. The net-
work segmentation is dened in the DHCP server in the form of sub-
nets. The management of dierent subnets and its components enables
us to fulll the capabilities of construction of network and dynamic
management of communication of devices.
Firewall The rewall is used to lter communication between the devices or
network segments. This enables us to fulll the capability of the system
to control communication. By setting appropriate rule we can allow or
deny Internet connectivity to the network segments. Device specic
rules for connectivity to specic addresses can also be congured using
the rewall.
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User Interface A user interface is a demo tool that is helpful to keep track
of dierent steps a device is going through during the device identica-
tion and device isolation processes. The user interface is not a major
component for actual isolation operation, but is benecial for debug-
ging the solution under development.
4.1.3 Design
Figure 4.1 describes the interaction between the components mentioned in
Section 4.1.2 as well the network isolation design of the solution.
Figure 4.1: Network Isolation Design
The solution depends on IoT Sentinel device identication service in the
cloud to provide the isolation prole, based on which the placement of the
device in a segmented network is carried out. However, the network must
be rst divided into several segments which are isolated from each other.
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In our solution, the network is divided into four subnets namely quarantine,
strict, restricted, and trusted. The quarantine subnet is the network segment
where devices are initially placed during device conguration process. The
isolation level for devices in quarantine segment is set to -1 until the actual
isolation level is received from the cloud. The strict, restricted, and trusted
subnets are for the devices with isolation value 0, 1, and 2 respectively. The
abilities of network segments are illustrated in the Table 4.1. For example,
the restricted subnet can access only specic IP's specied in the isolation
prole and cannot communicate with subnet other than strict and itself.
The DHCP server is congured to divide the network into the four subnets
described above. In order to keep the subnets isolated, a rewall must be
congured according to the capabilities described in Table 4.1.
Table 4.1: Network Segments Capabilities
Network
Segment
Isolation
Value
Internet
Communi-
cation
Communication with other
segments
Quarantine -1 Full No communication with other
segments
Strict 0 Blocked Allowed with strict and re-
stricted
Restricted 1 Specic IPs Allowed with strict and re-
stricted
Trusted 2 Full Allowed with trusted
At the security gateway, whenever a new device is associated with the
AP, the solution should place the device in the quarantine network until
its isolation prole is obtained from IoTSSP. We need to put the device in
quarantine network because IoT Sentinel takes time to ngerprint the device
and obtain the isolation prole. When the isolation prole is obtained, the
device is moved to the appropriate network segment according to its isolation
level.
The solution utilizes the isolation map to keep track of the isolation level
of the devices. When the device is in the quarantine network, the isolation
map has the default isolation level as -1 for the device. When the actual
isolation level is obtained from IoTSSP, the corresponding entry in the isola-
tion map is updated. The solution keeps track of any changes in the isolation
map and congures the DHCP server accordingly. The DHCP server is used
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to grant IP address and lease time to a device based on its isolation level in
the isolation map.
The rewall lters the communication across the dierent network seg-
ments dened. It also ensures the Internet connectivity required for certain
network segments. The system also updates the rewall in order to apply
any device-specic requirements in the isolation prole such as allowing com-
munication with specic IPs.
4.1.4 Flow Diagram
The ow diagram in Figure 4.2 presents the ow of control in the system.
Firstly, IoT Sentinel is started which also starts the wireless AP to al-
low IoT devices to connect to the home network. Thereafter, the solution
starts the DHCP server with the conguration to create four required sub-
nets namely quarantine, strict, restricted, and trusted. Then the default
rewall rules are loaded which ensures the isolation of subnets as mentioned
in Section 4.1.3.
Our solution then waits for detection of new MAC address. When a new
MAC address is detected, we add an entry in the isolation map with isolation
level -1 and then update the DHCP server to place the device in quarantine
subnet for initial conguration. Meanwhile, IoT Sentinel extracts the device
ngerprint and sends it to IoTSSP to obtain the isolation prole. Any errors
during the ngerprinting process are reported in the dashboard on the UI.
Note that, if the device has previously been congured successfully, it will
already have an entry in the isolation map. In such a case, the DHCP server
conguration le should ideally contain the appropriate entry for the device
and it should automatically get placed in its previously assigned subnet.
The isolation level is then checked from isolation prole and the congu-
ration les for DHCP server are updated and reloaded. DHCP conguration
les are updated such that if the isolation level is 0, 1, or 2, the device is
moved to strict, restricted, or trusted subnet respectively. Eectively, this
means that when the lease for the device in quarantine subnet expires, the
DHCP server will assign an IP address to a device in the new subnet based
on the updated conguration. For example, if an isolation level for a device
is 0 in isolation prole, after DHCP server update, it will get an IP address
from strict subnet when its initial lease from quarantine subnet expires.
If the isolation level for a device is 1, it also consists of a set of allowed
IPs that device can communicate. Thus, rewall rules are generated for the
device to access certain allowed specic IPs.
In case of an error situation where the isolation prole is not received from
IoTSSP, the DHCP conguration les are updated to remove the device from
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Figure 4.2: Flow Diagram
CHAPTER 4. PROPOSED SOLUTION AND IMPLEMENTATION 31
the quarantine subnet and the dashboard is updated with an error message
on the UI. This will eectively disconnect the device from the network when
its initial lease expires. This prevents any devices from persistently being in
the quarantine subnet if their isolation proles cannot be obtained in case of
any error. This ensures if isolation prole is not received for a device, it will
be removed out completely from the network.
4.2 Implementation Choices
In this section, we justify the implementation choices for techniques and tools
made for the solution.
4.2.1 Device Isolation and network segmentation
The objective of device isolation is to build isolated network segments within
the internal private network and between the external Internet world. We
studied various techniques that are used to facilitate the network segmenta-
tion. We studied two dierent approaches to perform device isolation. The
rst choice is setting up dierent isolated subnets and customization of a
DHCP server to provide IPs dynamically in dierent subnets. Subnetting
a network is done at layer 3 (network layer) of the TCP/IP model. The
subnets are isolated from each other by applying relevant rewall rules. The
second choice for the solution is to use a dynamic Virtual Local Area Network
(VLAN) [8]. Using dynamic VLAN, we can partition the network to create
isolated segment at layer 2 (data link layer) of the TCP/IP model. The
subdivision of the network into multiple VLANs is done by conguring the
network equipment such as a switch. A wireless user is placed in a specic
VLAN based on credentials supplied by the user based on the user group set
in the RADIUS server.
We decided to use the approach of subnetting to implement the device
isolation and network segmentation since it does not require any additional
network equipment as in the case of VLAN. Subnetting is a standard prac-
tice of dividing a network into smaller segments. By creating subnets we can
fulll the solution's capability of construction and division of the network
into dierent segments. The subnetting approach for device isolation with a
DHCP server and a rewall is not dependent on any external Authentication,
Authorization, and Accounting (AAA) server like RADIUS. All the congu-
ration can be done is one host thus making administration easier. Moreover,
free and open source implementation of the DHCP server and rewall are
easily available to implement the subnetting based approach.
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4.2.2 Components
Another important decision is to choose the DHCP server. DHCP server to
use should be able to run on the Linux platform. We have dierent isola-
tion levels for a device which correspond to network segments. DHCP server
should be customizable in order to address the need for dierent network
segments and device isolation levels. isc-dhcp-server [14] is open source
software that can be congured to manage dierent classes of devices and
dene the topology of network using subnets. The isolation level of a de-
vice can be mapped to a class of device in the isc-dhcp-server which is
easy to manage and congure. Therefore we use isc-dhcp-server as our
choice of the DHCP server. This helps in fullling our solution's capability
of construction of the network and dynamic management of hosts.
We use iptables [17] for rewall in order to address the control of com-
munication capability of our solution. It is also easy to obtain information
about how to construct eective iptables rules. iptables is included by
default in Linux distributions and is a well-known utility, thereby making it
an obvious choice.
For scripting purposes we use Python [28] in order to integrate and con-
gure dierent components (rewall, DHCP server, IoT Sentinel, etc.) to
fulll the capability of enforcing the isolation prole. Python is a simple
general purpose programming language. Moreover, Python is already used
in the IoT Sentinel project.
4.3 Implementation
For implementing the solution we rst describe the actual IP conguration of
the subnets which includes IP addresses and ranges. Then, we congure these
subnets in the isc-dhcp-server DHCP server. Thereafter, we implement
the iptables rules and extended the IoT Sentinel user interface. We also
described the conguration of hostapd to support device-specic Pre-Shared
Key (PSK).
4.3.1 Subnetting Approach
The DHCP server is congured such that the network uses the address
172.16.0.0/16. We can also use other private space depending on the size
of the home IoT network. The main network conguration is presented in
Table 4.2. We can accommodate a maximum total of 216   2 (65534) hosts
in the whole network.
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Table 4.2: Network conguration for main network
Network Parameter Value
Network 172.16.0.0/16
Netmask 255.255.0.0
Broadcast 172.16.255.255
HostMin 172.16.0.1
HostMax 172.16.255.254
Hosts/Net 65534
The main network is divided into four dierent subnets namely quaran-
tine, strict, restricted and trusted. The subnet conguration is presented in
Table 4.3. Since we have the total of four subnets, we borrowed two bits
from the host part for subnetting. Thus, each subnet can hold up to 16382
devices. However, borrowing more bits can give more exibility and leave
space for the creation of additional subnets in the future, but less number
of hosts in each subnet. Considering the number of hosts in a typical home
network, the approach we used leads to a waste of host addresses in the quar-
antine subnet since the number of devices that will use quarantine subnet
is lower compared to other subnets. For an optimized network setup, it is
recommended to have a smaller quarantine subnet and bigger other subnets.
Nevertheless, the current conguration is easy to understand and setup.
Table 4.3: Subnet conguration
Network
/ Parame-
ters
Subnet1
(Quaran-
tine)
Subnet2
(Strict)
Subnet3
(Restricted)
Subnet4
(Trusted)
Network 172.16.0.0/18 172.16.64.0/18 172.16.128.0/18 172.16.192.0/18
Netmask 255.255.192.0 255.255.192.0 255.255.192.0 255.255.192.0
Broadcast 172.16.63.255 172.16.127.255 172.16.191.255 172.16.255.255
HostMin 172.16.0.1 172.16.64.1 172.16.128.1 172.16.192.1
HostMax 172.16.63.254 172.16.127.254 172.16.191.254 172.16.255.254
Hosts/Net 16382 16382 16382 16382
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4.3.2 DHCP Server Conguration
The main conguration le for isc-dhcp-server is dhcpd.conf. In the
default conguration, the DHCP server listens on a network interface and
provides IP address from a range dened in the conguration le. We can
congure the dhcpd.conf le according to the network topology with dif-
ferent subnets declarations. Each subnet declaration is specied with its
address, subnet mask, lease time, etc. Four other conguration les repre-
senting the class for subnets are also used by DHCP server.
A class is a grouping of client devices. The devices can be grouped in
a class by matching their MAC hardware addresses. Figure 4.3 shows a
sample conguration le for a Trusted class. Each subclass entry in the
example conguration is a MAC address of a device that is placed in the
Trusted class.
class "Trusted" {
# match hardware address of the devices
match hardware;
}
# Devices (MAC addresses) in the class
subclass "Trusted" 1:98:01:a7:ae:57:23;
subclass "Trusted" 1:c0:ee:fb:35:73:e2;
subclass "Trusted" 1:d0:27:00:02:eb:2e;
Figure 4.3: Classing of Devices
We dene four classes Quarantine, Strict, Restricted and Trusted. Each
class is dened for the corresponding subnet. Each class is dened in a
separate les (e.g., dhcpd.conf.classQ for Quarantine class). These les are
then included in the main dhcpd.conf using the include statement. This
way the conguration is modular and and we only need to modify the class
les in order to move the devices between dierent subnets. For example,
if a device needs to be moved from quarantine to strict subnet we need to
delete the entry from Quarantine class le and add it to the Strict class le.
The full DHCP conguration le is described in Appendix A.1
The subnet declaration also contains a pool section which denes the IP
address range for the subnet and the class of devices which are allowed to
be a part of the subnet. Figure 4.4 shows the conguration for a trusted
subnet to allow devices from the Trusted class. Thus to place a device in
a certain subnet, its entry must be present in the corresponding class. The
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lease time for quarantine subnet is set for 40 seconds since we do not want
the device to stay unnecessarily long in quarantine subnet after receiving the
isolation prole. However, lowering the lease time further also increases the
DHCP communication overhead in DHCP server.
subnet 172.16.192.0 netmask 255.255.192.0 {
option broadcast-address 172.16.255.255;
option routers 172.16.0.1;
default-lease-time 600;
max-lease-time 600;
option domain-name "local";
option domain-name-servers 8.8.8.8, 8.8.4.4;
#Range of address for Trusted Subnet
pool {
allow members of "Trusted";
range 172.16.192.1 172.16.255.254;
}
}
Figure 4.4: Example declaration for trusted subnet
Consider an example scenario from the point of view of the device. For
the rst time when the device is connected to the network, the solution will
put the device's MAC address in the Quarantine class le. This will make
the DHCP server to give an IP address to the device in the quarantine subnet
with a lease time of 40 seconds. The lease can get renewed until its entry
exists in the Quarantine class le. When the isolation level is obtained (e.g.
2), the solution will remove the device's entry from the Quarantine class and
create an entry in the Trusted class le (for isolation level 2). Thus when
the lease for the device in quarantine subnet expires, the device will ask for
a new lease. However, the DHCP server will not grant a new lease for the
IP address in the quarantine subnet, since the device will not match the
Quarantine class but the Trusted class. Instead, the DHCP server will oer
an IP address in the trusted subnet with a new lease. Thus, the device is
eectively moved from the quarantine subnet to the trusted subnet.
4.3.3 iptables
Firewalls are congured with a set of rules for a network interface to allow,
deny or lter trac. iptables can be set to lter the communication based
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on dierent variables such as IP address, protocol, port, and interfaces. In
the default mode iptables allows all trac and does not have any ltering
rules. On top of the default rule, we add rules to lter the trac based on
our requirements.
We dene three dierent sets of rules in iptables for network isolation,
enabling internet access, and device specic rules as follows.
4.3.3.1 Rules for Isolating Subnets
The rst set of rules ensure that subnets are not allowed to communicate and
are isolated from each other according to the capabilities dened in Table 4.1.
This set of rules are presented in Figure 4.5 and is applied initially when the
wireless AP starts and a network is setup. This set of rules is always active
and does not change.
The rules prevent forwarding of packets from one subnet to the other
on the security gateway. For example, the following rules ensure that any
device placed in the strict subnet (172.16.64.0/18) cannot communicate with
a device in the trusted subnet (172.16.192.0/18) as well as the quarantine
subnet (172.16.0.0/18).
iptables -I FORWARD -i br0
-s 172.16.64.0/18 -d 172.16.0.0/18 -j DROP
iptables -I FORWARD -i br0
-s 172.16.64.0/18 -d 172.16.192.0/18 -j DROP
Since this rules are applied at the security gateway where all the communi-
cation from the subnet passes through, the rules essentially drop the packets
and prevent them from getting forwarded from one subnet (source) to the
other (destination). Thus, the subnets are isolated.
4.3.3.2 Rules for Enabling Internet Access
The second set of rules is constructed in order to give Internet access to the
subnets according to Table 4.1. Since all the subnets are behind a NAT,
we need to enable IP masquerading [16] to enable Internet access. Refer
Section 2.4.7 for more details on IP masquerading. Figure 4.6 shows the list
of rules that ensure that there is Internet access for quarantine, restricted and
trusted subnet by allowing IP masquerading for the said subnets. We need to
enable Internet access for the restricted subnets in order to allow the devices
to access specic hosts on the Internet. Since there is no IP masquerading
enabled for the strict subnet, it will not Internet access. These rules are also
applied as soon as the wireless AP is set up.
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# No communication from quarantine to other subnets
iptables -I FORWARD -i br0
-s 172.16.0.0/18 -d 172.16.64.0/18 -j DROP
iptables -I FORWARD -i br0
-s 172.16.0.0/18 -d 172.16.128.0/18 -j DROP
iptables -I FORWARD -i br0
-s 172.16.0.0/18 -d 172.16.192.0/18 -j DROP
# No communication from strict to other subnets than restricted
iptables -I FORWARD -i br0
-s 172.16.64.0/18 -d 172.16.0.0/18 -j DROP
iptables -I FORWARD -i br0
-s 172.16.64.0/18 -d 172.16.192.0/18 -j DROP
# No communication from restricted to other subnets than strict
iptables -I FORWARD -i br0
-s 172.16.128.0/18 -d 172.16.0.0/18 -j DROP
iptables -I FORWARD -i br0
-s 172.16.128.0/18 -d 172.16.192.0/18 -j DROP
# No communication from trusted to all other subnets
iptables -I FORWARD -i br0
-s 172.16.192.0/18 -d 172.16.0.0/18 -j DROP
iptables -I FORWARD -i br0
-s 172.16.192.0/18 -d 172.16.64.0/18 -j DROP
iptables -I FORWARD -i br0
-s 172.16.192.0/18 -d 172.16.128.0/18 -j DROP
Figure 4.5: Iptables rule to prevent communication across subnets
iptables -t nat -I POSTROUTING -o eth0
-s 172.16.0.0/18 -j MASQUERADE
iptables -t nat -I POSTROUTING -o eth0
-s 172.16.128.0/18 -j MASQUERADE
iptables -t nat -I POSTROUTING -o eth0
-s 172.16.192.0/18 -j MASQUERADE
Figure 4.6: Rules to enable Internet access for subnets
4.3.3.3 Device Specic Rules
The third set of rules is applied dynamically for each device in the restricted
subnet since devices in restricted subnet should be able to access only certain
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IP addresses mentioned in the isolation prole. As soon as the isolation prole
is received at the gateway with restricted isolation level (1), we parse the
allowed ips eld and generate this set of rules and applied. By default, the
restricted subnet should deny all outgoing trac except to strict, while each
dynamic rule generated after receiving isolation prole at security gateway
allows trac to a specic destination. For example, the below rule enables
access to a specic host (along.umeng.com), strict subnet, restricted subnet,
and denies access to all other addresses. We used MAC address of the device
in the ltering rules rather than the IP address because the MAC address is
constant whereas an IP address may change when the device reconnects to
the network.
# Allow host
iptables -I FORWARD -i br0 -d along.umeng.com
-m mac --mac-source d0:27:00:02:eb:2e -j ACCEPT
# Allow strict subnet
iptables -I FORWARD -i br0 -d 172.16.64.0/18
-m mac --mac-source d0:27:00:02:eb:2e -j ACCEPT
# Allow restricted subnet
iptables -I FORWARD -i br0 -d 172.16.128.0/18
-m mac --mac-source d0:27:00:02:eb:2e -j ACCEPT
# Deny rest of the network
iptables -I FORWARD -i br0 -d *
-m mac --mac-source d0:27:00:02:eb:2e -j DROP
4.3.3.4 Order of Evaluation of the rules
The order of evaluation of rules for any packet owing through the AP is as
follows.
1. Device Specic Rules
2. Rules for Isolating Subnets
3. Rules of enabling Internet for subnets
Note that if a packet satises any rule condition, the consecutive rule
evaluation is skipped.
4.3.4 Hostapd Conguration
IoT Sentinel uses hostapd to set up a WiFi access point. The wireless com-
munication is set up in infrastructure mode which ensures that all device
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communication passes through an access point. Thus, the infrastructure
mode setup prevents direct device to device communication.
In IoT Sentinel, hostapd is congured to use a single pre-shared key for
all devices. If a single pre-shared key is compromised, then any device can
get access to the network. Attackers can use dictionary attacks on snied
message integrity data from the 4-way handshake to nd the passphrase.
Therefore, we congured hostapd to use device-specic pre-shared keys for
authentication. In this case, each device uses a dierent passphrase to con-
nect to the AP. Thus, in case a key is compromised for a certain device it
cannot be used by other devices to connect to the AP because each key is
tied to a MAC address. This reduces the attack surface.
hostapd uses a conguration le hostapd.conf to set the parameters
required for setting up an AP in infrastructure mode. A le containing
a list of MAC address and corresponding passphrase pairs is created and
specied in the wpa psk file parameter of hostapd.conf le. A sample
hostapd.conf le is available in Appendix A.2.
4.3.5 User Interface
There are multiple processes involved in device identication and isolation.
In the deployed solution, a user does not care about the processes involved.
However, the processes are tracked for testing and debugging of the system
as well as the collection of the data for evaluation purposes. We extended
the IoT Sentinel user interface to show the additional steps done for device
isolation after receiving the isolation prole. Figure 4.7 presents the sequence
of events during the device identication process. As seen in the gure, a
new device is encountered at the gateway, IoT Sentinel device identication
process starts and the device is placed in the quarantine subnet. The red
rectangular boxes highlight the events related to device isolation.
Figure 4.8 shows the sequence of events after the isolation prole is ob-
tained. The red rectangular boxes highlight the applied dynamic iptables
rules and the movement of the device from quarantine subnet to the restricted
subnet. The IP address which is shown at top red rectangular box of 4.7 is
IP address from restricted subnet updated after device isolation is performed
(initially it is from quarantine subnet 172.16.0.10).
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Figure 4.7: UI before isolation prole is obtained
Figure 4.8: UI after isolation prole is obtained
Chapter 5
Evaluation
This chapter presents the evaluation of the system. The system is evaluated
for the requirements listed in section 3.3. Section 5.1 explain the evaluation
of security requirement S1. Section 5.2 describe the functional requirements
R1-R3 while the usability requirements are evaluated in Section 5.3. Refer
to Section 3.3 for a detailed description of all the requirements.
5.1 Security
The security requirement states that the communication of a vulnerable de-
vice must be restricted in order to thwart the capabilities of an attacker.
The requirement also states that device to device and device to Internet
communication must be controlled by the AP. The wireless AP is set up in
infrastructure mode which ensures that device to device communication hap-
pens only through the AP. Since all device communication passes through
AP, it is controllable by iptables in the security gateway.
After implementing the solution, we observe that the network is isolated
into dierent subnets as described in Table 4.1. Thus, any vulnerable de-
vice connected to the system will be placed into either the strict or the
restricted subnet by our solution. The restriction is enforced with iptables
as described in Section 4.3.3. In case of strict isolation level, the vulnerable
device will not be able to connect to the Internet while in case of restricted
it can communicate with only selected IPs or hosts. Moreover, a vulnerable
device in the untrusted segment (strict or restricted) cannot communicate
with the trusted segment. Considering the successful placement of a vulner-
able device in the strict or restricted subnet, following attacker capabilities
described in Section 3.2.3 have been mitigated.
 The attacker cannot gain control over a compromised device remotely
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since the device has no external communication capabilities in the strict
or restricted subnet. Moreover, the devices are behind a NAT which
will restrict all inbound connections from the Internet.
 The attacker cannot use a compromised device to locate or mount at-
tacks on trusted devices since there is no communication allowed be-
tween vulnerable and trusted devices as they are in isolated subnets
and the gateway will not allow packets from being forwarded from un-
trusted segments to the trusted segment.
 A compromised device cannot open an attack path for attackers (e.g.
via SSH tunnel or connection to cloud service) because communication
to the Internet is controlled for the untrusted segment in the security
gateway.
 A device cannot discover other vulnerable devices on the network or
vice-versa because of the isolation of subnets and the gateway prevent-
ing the communication.
When a device initially gets connected to the network, it is placed in the
quarantine subnet until it gets congured. During this phase, the device
has access to the Internet for its conguration. However, the quarantine
subnet is still isolated from the other subnets. The device will be moved to
an appropriate subnet when its isolation prole is obtained. The device is
disconnected if its isolation prole cannot be obtained to prevent malicious
devices to stay in the network. Thus communication in the quarantine subnet
is also controlled and isolated from trusted devices.
This isolation of devices in quarantine, strict, restricted, and trusted sub-
nets along with a tight control of communication between the devices, sub-
nets, and Internet, mitigates the attacker capabilities and fulll the security
requirements of our solution.
Although not a security requirement, the solution also has an added secu-
rity benet if device specic keys are used as explained in Section 4.3.4. The
usage of device specic keys ensures that unauthorized access to the network
is not feasible even if a PSK is compromised for a specic device.
5.2 Functionality
Requirement R1 is fullled when the isolation prole from IoT Sentinel is
enforced. We constructed the network environment comprised of isolated
subnets for dierent isolation levels. Our solution segregates the devices into
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strict, restricted and trusted subnets. The isolation prole obtained from IoT
Sentinel for a device is enforced by conguring the DHCP server to place the
device into a correct subnet based on its isolation level. The implementa-
tion of the control ow explained in Section 4.1.4 fullls the requirement of
enforcing the isolation prole. We evaluated this requirement by connecting
a devices with dierent isolation proles and observed that the devices were
rst placed in the quarantine subnet and eventually moved into appropriate
subnets.
Requirement R2 states that an easy and a fast reconguration of the net-
work is required as well as the successful implementation of device specic
rules derived from the isolation prole. The network is congured accord-
ing to the subnetting approach by the DHCP server conguration described
in Section 4.3.2. The device specic rules based on the isolation prole are
implemented dynamically by adding additional iptables rules as described
in Section 4.3.3.3. We observed that the solution does not impact the al-
ready connected devices when a new device is introduced into the network
since every new connection starts a new instance of the conguration scripts.
The whole process does not require manual intervention since the solution
congures the DHCP server (eg. network conguration, IP addresses) and
iptables automatically, thus making the process fast and easy. This fullls
the requirement R2.
The speed of reconguration of network to move device from quarantine
to other subnets is dependent on initial lease time of quarantine subnet. The
experimental analysis to measure speed of reconguration is explained below.
5.2.1 Performance
Requirement R3 states that the system should have a high usability, low per-
formance overhead and a minimum time overhead on IoT Sentinel's existing
processes. For the performance evaluation, we set up a test environment
and measured the performance of the system in terms of time-delay and
throughput analysis. The experiment setup and the subsequent evaluation
is presented below.
5.2.1.1 Experimental Setup
We used an IoT Sentinel setup running on a Raspberry Pi [23]. We used two
IoT devices namely a SmartSocket [24] device and a Netatmo [21] weather
station. First, the devices were set up with their corresponding mobile appli-
cations [9, 20] using an Android phone to collect their reference ngerprints
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for building the classier. After the isolation proles and the device classiers
were set up in IoTSSP, our solution was tested and evaluated.
The device conguration and subsequent placement in the isolated sub-
net were tracked in the UI. The timings were also recorded for the whole
conguration process, IoT Sentinel operations, application of rules, subnet
reallocation, etc. IoT Sentinel operations refers to total time taken for n-
gerprint capture, feature extraction, feature compression and obtaining clas-
sication results from IoTSSP. The time for applying rules refers to the total
time taken for dynamic generation and application of rules based on infor-
mation in the allowed ips eld in isolation prole. The subnet reallocation
delay refers to the time taken to move device from quarantine subnet to the
intended subnet after classication result is obtained. The experiment was
repeated 15 times to determine the average  standard deviation.
For throughput analysis, we set up the security gateway with varying
number of rules in each experiment iteration and recorded the throughput
in Kbits/sec for communication from a test device to a remote server. We
started with base number of default rules and took measurements for 1000,
2000, 5000 and 10000 rules at security gateway. The objective of this experi-
ment is to observe the eect of number of iptables rules in the throughput.
5.2.1.2 Timing Analysis
Table 5.1 shows the breakdown of average timing data collected for each of
the tested devices for dierent processes.
Table 5.1: Timing breakdown
Process/Device SmartSocket Netatmo
Mean  StDev Mean  StDev
IoT Sentinel Operations 131.78 s  5.61 s 130.26 s  1.07 s
Apply Rules 1.37 s  2.3 s 0.71 s  0.61 s
Subnet Reallocation Delay 55.44 s  19.61 s 46.29 s  40.47 s
Total time for conguration 187.22 s  16.60 s 176.63 s  41.36 s
For the SmartSocket device, the IoT Sentinel operations took 131.78 sec-
onds. The processing of isolation prole to generate and apply the dynamic
rules took 1.37 seconds. Moving the device from the quarantine subnet to the
intended subnet took 55.44 seconds. The total time taken is 187.22 seconds
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on average. Similarly, for Netatmo weather station, the IoT Sentinel oper-
ations took 130.26 seconds on average. It took 0.71 seconds to apply rules.
Moving the device from quarantine subnet to the intended subnet took 46.29
seconds. The total time taken was 176.63 seconds on average.
Based on the above data, we calculated the time overhead incurred with
our approach in Table 5.2. It is seen that the time overhead is +42.07 %
and +35.6 % over IoT Sentinel device identication for SmartSocket and
Netatmo devices respectively.
Table 5.2: Timing Overhead Comparison
(A) (B) Time Dif-
ference
% Overhead
SmartSocket 131.78 s 187.22 s +55.44 s +42.07%
Netatmo 130.26 s 176.63 s +46.37 s +35.60%
(A) IoT Sentinel Device Identication
(B) IoT Sentinel Device Identication + Isolation
A signicant factor that contributes to the time overhead is the move-
ment of the device from quarantine subnet to the intended subnet because
of the lease duration of 40 seconds. The device will continue to stay in the
quarantine subnet until its lease expires. The DHCP server has no control
over the lease until the lease duration is over, which means that the device
does not get moved to a new subnet unless the device asks for a new lease.
In some cases, in order to save power, devices do not ask for a new lease even
after it expires and stays dormant for some time or until a manual interaction
occurs. This adds to the time delay.
The lease duration for the quarantine subnet can be lowered to minimize
the delay so that existing leases expire sooner. However, if lease duration is
set for a short time, it increases the DHCP communication which might add
a high load on the DHCP server in case of more devices. During a single
device conguration process, it is likely that there will be only one device in
quarantine subnet. So, choosing shorter lease time seems more appropriate
to reduce the delay. However, the shorter lease will create frequent renewals
of a lease, which add noise to the ngerprint of an IoT device which might
reduce the accuracy of device identication. Therefore, the lease time for
quarantine subnet is set neither too long nor too short. Moreover, it should
also be noted that this delay in encountered only during the rst instance
the device is connected to the network. Once the device is congured, the
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Table 5.3: Impact of Number of Rules in Throughput
Number of Rules Throughput in Kbits/sec
0 16978.509
1000 16516.036
2000 14060.869
5000 9480.578
10000 5852.48
subsequent connections will not be tracked for performing IoT Sentinel device
identication and our isolation solution. DHCP server places the device into
its precongured intended subnet instead of the quarantine subnet.
5.2.1.3 Throughput Analysis
The impact of a high number of iptables rules in our solution is another
metric that we evaluated. We added dummy rules to iptables for random
source MAC addresses similar to the device-specic rules mentioned in Sec-
tion 4.3.3.3. We used a Linux host allocated to the trusted subnet which
transferred data to a remote server with varying number of rules in the secu-
rity gateway. Table 5.3 presents the throughput collected for varying number
of rules.
Figure 5.1 depicts the eect of the number of rules to the throughput of
the system. With the increase in the number of rules, we observe that the
throughput of the system decreases linearly. We see that the throughput
decreases by 2.72 percent when there are 1000 rules as compared to the
default number of rules. The rate of decrease in throughput is lower until
1000 rules compared to other higher intervals of the number of rules. In a
typical home setup with limited devices, the number of rules is not expected
to rise drastically. The throughput decreases signicantly with the higher
number of rules because each packet goes through all the rules sequentially
in iptables chain.
Nevertheless, in a typical home network scenario, the system throughput
will not get aected signicantly. Let us consider a home network scenario
with 20 IoT devices in the restricted subnet, each with 10 device-specic
rules to allow communication with specic IP addresses. The default setup
of our solution has 3 rules for IP masquerading and 10 rules for isolating
subnets as explained in Section 4.3.3. Moreover, the devices in trusted and
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Figure 5.1: System throughput vs. number of iptables rules
strict subnets do not require any device specic rules ideally. Thus the total
number of rules in iptables will be 213 (3 + 10 + 20 * 10). As seen in
our experiments, this number of rules does not aect the system throughput
signicantly.
5.3 Usability
There are two usability requirements U1 and U2 related to deployment and
demo user interface respectively which are described in subsequent sections.
5.3.1 Deployment
Requirement U1 states that the solution should be easily deployable in OTS
routers. The major components used in our solution are, a DHCP server and
a rewall. OTS routers typically have a DHCP server and a rewall already
present. The router rmware can be modied to include the functionality
of our solution and will not require signicant changes. Moreover, the pri-
mary motivation for this work is to create an SDN free approach for device
isolation. Our solution does not use any SDN components and hence it is
possible to deploy on traditional routers.
Our solution can be easily deployed on any Linux based system because
we use isc-dhcp-server and iptables which are open source and well
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supported on Linux. iptables is typically the default rewall in most of the
Linux distributions. This makes the deployment easy.
5.3.2 Demo User Interface
The usability requirement U2 states that the isolation approach should be
aided with a demo UI that is useful for showing the dierent steps of device
isolation approach. We modied the existing IoT Sentinel demo UI and pre-
sented in Section 4.3.5. The extended demo UI correctly shows the dierent
steps the device goes through during the device identication and isolation
process. Figures 4.7 and 4.8 show a sample UI. This addresses the usability
requirement of having a demo user interface.
Chapter 6
Related Work
IoT is a new and an active area of research trying to address problems across
dierent domains such as security, networking, applications, etc. Security
research in IoT is still in the infant stage [64]. Most of the prior works have
been targeted to identify potential threats and adapt the existing security
infrastructure to the IoT environment. Our work considers securing trusted
IoT devices in the network from other vulnerable devices by proling IoT
devices and dening their capabilities at the network level. The network
is managed in a way that there is a clear line of separation between the
trusted and untrusted devices. We found a limited number of close research
prototypes ([38, 59]) aiming at controlling the vulnerable IoT devices. In this
section, we discuss related works carried out in the domain of IoT security.
In [58], Noor et al. have given a clear picture of the threats to a wire-
less network and discussed the eects of latest developments such as BYOD
and device tethering on the security of Wi-Fi networks. The authors also
present a case study of cybercrime incidents and level of Wi-Fi security in
Malaysia. The results of the case study show that there is a steady increase
in a number of signicant threats to the wireless networks. The authors
have also presented countermeasures and mitigation strategies that help to
protect wireless APs and networks such as choosing strong authentication
protocol, disabling SSID broadcast, enabling the rewall, intrusion preven-
tion etc. The paper was helpful especially in getting an overview of the state
of Wi-Fi network security.
In [34], Atamli et al. have discussed a threat-based security analysis of
IoT. The authors have discussed relevant use cases of IoT such as power
management, smart car, and smart health care system. The authors have
identied the sources of threats such as malicious user, bad manufacturer and
external adversary. They also identied dierent classes of attacks vectors
in the use cases such as device tampering, information disclosure, spoong,
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elevation of privilege, signal injection etc. Thereafter they have discussed
impacts of such attacks and deduced the security and privacy properties of
the IoT systems. Such properties include the need for access control mech-
anism in IoT device, protecting data exchanged between a user and an IoT
device etc. The authors have also conducted a preliminary risk assessment
for those systems with respect to dierent attack vectors.
In [59], the authors have proposed a network level protection to block
communication of vulnerable devices that utilizes a database of rewall rules
maintained in the cloud. Three dierent IoT devices namely Nest Smoke
Alarm, Hue Light-Bulbs, and WeMo Motion Switch were studied to identify
security issues related to them. For example, Nest Smoke Alarm transfers
20Kb of data to its log server daily, which is suspicious. The solution is then
tested by extracting rewall rules from the cloud and applying them to a
device. The test was successful to block the device's communication to the
log server without aecting other functions of the device. The approach used
in the paper to control the communication of vulnerable device using the
rewall is similar to our work.
Paper [38] describes an approach for limiting malware propagation in
IoT network with the number of unpatched resource constrained IoT devices.
Instead of directly patching individual malware propagating IoT device, their
approach uses patching intermediate nodes such as AP, Base Station (BS) or
gateway with which IoT devices communicate. The approach is trac-aware
which means that the intermediate node which can contact a high number of
IoT nodes is patched rst to avoid the catastrophic spread of malware. The
authors conclude that the approach can assist detection of new attacks and
patching strategies.
In [63], Matt Smith describes tackling security and privacy issues in a
smart home environment from the point of view of network topology and in-
frastructure. The author has also discussed technologies used in IoT environ-
ments such as common wireless standards including IEEE 802.15.4, 6LoW-
PAN and IEEE 802.11. The paper focuses on the improvement of security
in the home network to protect the network by incorporating security tech-
niques practiced in enterprise level systems. This includes commonly used
approaches such as device authentication using RADIUS [11] or Kerberos
[15] and setting up DMZs. These approaches can be imported into the smart
home scenario to aid network segmentation. The author has concluded that
using enterprise level techniques may be too complex for simple home net-
work maintenance. This work suggests a theoretical approach for securing
the home network by borrowing techniques used in enterprise level networks
which is hard and expensive to deploy. Though the motivation of work is
similar to our's, our solution is practically implemented, more lightweight
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and easily deployable.
F-Secure SENSE [10] aims to provide security in home networks and pro-
tect connected devices from online threats. F-Secure SENSE consists of a
securely congured router, mobile application, and a cloud service. F-Secure
SENSE monitors the trac of all connected devices to the router in real time
and provides dierent protection features such as blocking trac from a com-
promised device, blocking malicious connection etc. The mobile application
allows dierent security congurations for the router. F-Secure SENSE ana-
lyzes the network trac of any device connected to the router with automatic
protection against phishing, intrusive tracking and attacks. Upcoming fea-
tures include parental control, guest wi, IoT device reputation-based protec-
tion, etc. F-Secure provides automatic updates for SENSE router. Though
the technical implementation details of the product are unavailable, this work
is similar to our work in a way that both try to control the trac of vul-
nerable devices. However, F-Secure SENSE is a commercial product already
available in the market that addresses dierent areas of security. Dojo [6]
is also one another product already in the market that is aimed at securing
home against vulnerable devices by providing control over the devices in the
network. It analyzes the trac of home network and enforces the security.
Lancope's Stealthwatch System [22] uses a software-dened approach for
network segmentation. The system makes use of the dynamic policies based
on contextual information around a node's role. Such approach is referred
to as active segmentation. The solution is feasible for enterprise network's
security. The approach requires a network administration skills for designing
and modeling of segmentation policies which is suitable for nodes based on
their role.
In their master's thesis [27], Stelma investigated the network security of
the home networks. Similar to our work, the author has proposed a solution
to enhance the security of the home network using subnetting and a DHCP
server for isolating devices at the designed gateway. They created isolated
subnets dedicated to unregistered devices within a single IP subnet dened
for registered devices. The discussions that we made about the eect of
setting up a longer/shorter DHCP lease time in our solution are similar
to this work. In [66], authors have presented the signicance and usage of
VLAN technology in their library network. The logical segregation of internal
subnet of a library is achieved from other distrusted network segments. Cisco
switches are congured to divide main library network into four VLANs with
dierent authority levels to ensure data security.
In [48], Kevin et al. have presented the Improved-Cross Layer Scheduling
Model to ensure an optimized resource management in home networks at a
gateway. In their experiment, they used a subnetting technique to divide the
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intelligent home network across six subnets for Bluetooth, Zigbee, Ultra Wide
Band, Smart Grid, Body Area and WiFi. Subnets and devices in the network
are classied and prioritized. Authors have simulated a testbed to compare
Cross Layer Switching (CLS) and Dynamic Load Balancing (DLB) and eval-
uate the network. The simulation results show a good network throughout
and minimal delay. The paper is more focused on evaluation network per-
formance among prioritized subnets.
Chapter 7
Conclusions
In this chapter we summarize our contributions, describe areas of improve-
ments for future work and draw conclusions.
7.1 Summary of Contributions
The contributions of this thesis are summarized below:
 A technique for automatically enforcing isolation proles from
IoT Sentinel using commonly available network primitives
Our solution integrates with IoT Sentinel and automatically enforces
the isolation proles which are used to perform device isolation. IoT
Sentinel uses SDN based approach to utilize isolation proles to per-
form device isolation. We proposed and implemented device isolation
using standard network functionality available on o-the-shelf APs. We
present a device isolation technique, which addresses the security re-
quirement of restricting communication of vulnerable devices. The iso-
lation technique addresses the communication capabilities for devices
with dierent isolation proles. The isolation technique is based on
dividing the network provided by the AP into isolated network subnets
using subnetting approach and controlling communication of subnets
using a rewall. A DHCP server is customized to place the devices
dynamically into required network segments. We make use of generally
available tools namely isc-dhcp-server for DHCP customization and
iptables for a rewall.
 Evaluation of the implemented device isolation approach.
The device isolation solution is further evaluated to measure the delay
overhead incurred on the IoT Sentinel setup for device identication.
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The timing delay of +42.07% and +35.6% over IoT Sentinel device
identication was observed for two test IoT devices (Smartsocket and
Netatmo) while performing isolation. Based on the evaluation, the
overhead incurred is found to be acceptable since the eect of overhead
is only during the rst time a device is introduced. We also evaluated
the eects of the number of rewall rules on the system throughput
and found that it does not signicantly aect the throughput in a
home network scenario. We observed that having 1000 iptables rules
decreased the throughput by 2.72%. We also discussed the deployability
of our solution.
7.2 Future Work
The solution can be enhanced further. The subnetting process used in the
solution provides equal numbers of hosts in all subnets. The placement of
devices in the quarantine subnet is temporary and devices will not be present
in the quarantine subnet forever. Therefore, minimizing the size of the quar-
antine subnet can lead to a more exible design and have room for more
devices in other subnets.
In the performance evaluation, we observed that a longer lease time for
devices in quarantine subnet impact adversely on the total time taken for
device conguration. The overhead is lower if the lease time is reduced so
that devices are moved to their intended subnets quickly. However, this
comes at the cost of high load on the DHCP server. Finding the optimal
lease time is an area for improving the performance of the solution.
In our solution, the DHCP server reads the updated conguration les
from the disk whenever it needs to move the devices between subnets. How-
ever, loading les from the disk is a performance bottleneck. Finding tech-
niques for using a memory mapped conguration or an alternative DHCP
server implementation which uses better techniques is a candidate for future
work.
Our evaluation work is done with a limited set of devices. Since dierent
IoT devices have dierent ways of connecting to network the amount of over-
head diers from device to device. Thus, evaluating our system with more
types of devices will be useful to nd out the reliability of the system and
identify areas for improvement.
The solution is built and tested on Raspberry Pi 3 device. A direction
for future work is to integrate the solution in OTS routers to improve the
deployability of the solution.
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7.3 Conclusion
IoT Smart home networks pose a range of security and privacy challenges.
Since the number of IoT devices deployed is growing, maintaining the secu-
rity of IoT networks is crucial. Protecting our network from the vulnerable
devices is important. It is always recommended to install proper software
updates and patches for all devices in the network. But a lack of updates of
patches leave some devices vulnerable in the network. Properly identifying
vulnerable devices and restricting them from accessing other valuable and
trusted device is necessary. Our work proposes to segregate such vulnera-
ble devices into dierent isolated network segments such that secure devices
stay protected. Essentially our solution protects the trusted devices in the
network from vulnerable devices.
We successfully designed and implemented our solution and solved the
problem of device isolation with an acceptable performance overhead. Iso-
lated network segments help to dene boundaries for devices with varying
security and communication needs. It helps to enforce security in IoT envi-
ronments when a device is identied correctly by IoT Sentinel. Our solution
is thus suitable to address the need for identifying the vulnerable devices and
isolate them from the trusted devices.
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Appendix A
Conguration Files
A.1 DHCP Conguration File
# Include configuration files consisting of list of devices
include "/etc/dhcp/dhcpd.conf.classS";
include "/etc/dhcp/dhcpd.conf.classR";
include "/etc/dhcp/dhcpd.conf.classT";
include "/etc/dhcp/dhcpd.conf.classQ";
ddns-update-style none;
default-lease-time 600;
max-lease-time 7200;
authoritative;
log-facility local7;
# Network Declaration
shared-network my_network{
#Quarantine Subnet Declaration
subnet 172.16.0.0 netmask 255.255.192.0 {
option broadcast-address 172.16.63.255;
option routers 172.16.0.1;
default-lease-time 40;
max-lease-time 40;
option domain-name "local";
option domain-name-servers 8.8.8.8, 8.8.4.4;
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#Specifying range of address for Quaratine Subnet
pool {
allow members of "Quarantine";
range 172.16.0.10 172.16.63.254;
}
} #End of Quaratine subnet declaration
#Strict Subnet Declaration
subnet 172.16.64.0 netmask 255.255.192.0 {
option broadcast-address 172.16.127.255;
option routers 172.16.0.1;
default-lease-time 600;
max-lease-time 600;
option domain-name "local";
option domain-name-servers 8.8.8.8, 8.8.4.4;
#Range of address for Strict Subnet
pool {
allow members of "Strict";
range 172.16.64.2 172.16.127.254;
}
} #End of Strict subnet declaration
#Restricted Subnet Declaration
subnet 172.16.128.0 netmask 255.255.192.0 {
option broadcast-address 172.16.191.255;
option routers 172.16.0.1;
default-lease-time 600;
max-lease-time 600;
option domain-name "local";
option domain-name-servers 8.8.8.8, 8.8.4.4;
#Range of address for Restricted Subnet
pool {
allow members of "Restricted";
range 172.16.128.2 172.16.191.254;
}
} #End of Restricted subnet declaration
#Trusted subnet declaration
subnet 172.16.192.0 netmask 255.255.192.0 {
option broadcast-address 172.16.255.255;
option routers 172.16.0.1;
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default-lease-time 3600;
max-lease-time 3600;
option domain-name "local";
option domain-name-servers 8.8.8.8, 8.8.4.4;
#Range of address for Trusted Subnet
pool {
allow members of "Trusted";
range 172.16.192.2 172.16.255.254;
}
} #End of Trusted subnet declaration
}# End of main network declaration
A.2 Hostapd Conguration File
interface=wlan0
driver=nl80211
hw_mode=g
bssid=c8:3a:35:c1:e1:30
ssid=IoTSentinel
channel=1
auth_algs=1 # 1=wpa, 2=wep, 3=both
wpa=2 # WPA2 only
wpa_key_mgmt=WPA-PSK
rsn_pairwise=CCMP
wpa_psk_file=/etc/hostapd.wpa_psk
